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Thread: Cultural Impacts on Evolving Species

  1. #21
    Join Date
    Jan 2015
    This article introduces philosophical changes taking place which are mirrored in neuroscience. It has much value and we again see FORMS which cause our brains to evolve through neuroplastic epigenetic and cultural interfacing - I suggest.

    "Catherine Malabou is unquestionably one of the most important French philosophers of this generation. Her work has opened new perspectives on the history of philosophy, the relation between philosophy and science and the meaning of philosophy itself. The novel concept which brought about these seminal shifts is her thought of “plasticity.” This concept was first articulated in her doctoral thesis L’ Avenir de Hegel which was published in 1996 and translated into English in 2005 as The Future of Hegel: Plasticity, Temporality and Dialectic.2 While the concept of plasticity [Plaztizitšt] has a specific and delimited role in Hegel’s philosophy, the significance of Malabou’s reading is that she transforms this term into a concept which is able to reinterpret the whole of Hegel’s thought. Departing from the prosaic sense of plasticity as the moulding and retention of form, Malabou rethinks the meaning of plasticity as a transformative power immanent … being is revealed to be nothing—but its mutability.1within form itself.

    Beyond the metaphysical understanding of form as the mere contour of matter, Malabou envisions form itself as a site of self-dissolution and re-generation: “Between the emergence and the annihilation of form, plasticity carries, as its own possibility, self-engendering and self-destruction.”3 It is this sense of transformation that provides the basis for Malabou’s original re-reading of Hegel in which plasticity is uncovered as a metabolic alterity that structures the formation of time and futurity in Hegel’s philosophy. However, already in this first work, the regenerative thought of plasticity also announced the promise of a different future for the philosophy of Martin Heidegger. In The Future of Hegel, Heidegger’s reading of Hegel in terms of prosaic temporality is presented as the traditional account which the articulation of a Hegelian temporal plasticity is able to pass beyond. However, plasticity not only provided a resource for challenging the Heideggerian reading, it already announced itself as a thought which overflowed this initial confrontation and could be deployed and discovered at the heart of Heidegger’s own thought of being: “Heidegger never […] invested [the notion of plasticity] with ontological significance. Thus it is as if Hegel retrospectively has offered to him an instrument indispensable to the intelligibility of his ideas.”4

    Although the concept of plasticity was first discovered in Hegel it does not remain simply a Hegelian notion, but rather, can be seen to operate both within the Hegelian system and also outside of it as a wider and autonomous hermeneutic instrument. Malabou is explicit that the applicability of plasticity beyond Hegel assumes a semantic and critical enlargement of the concept of plasticity. Just as the discovery of plasticity had opened an unthought alterity within the Hegelian dialectic, its wider application was able to articulate an unforeseen metabolic structure within the thought of ontological difference: “Plasticity inscribes the motive of metamorphosis right at the heart of the dialectic, and metamorphosis inscribes the motive of plasticity right at the heart of the thought of being. This intersection pointed the way for Le Change Heidegger.”5 The original French version Le Change Heidegger: Du fantastique en philosophie was published in 2004 and was first translated into English in 2011 as The Heidegger Change: On the Fantastic in Philosophy.

    Although the English language reception of this work is just beginning, it is clear that Malabou’s reading of Heidegger is original, compelling, and in terms of its implications for understanding Heidegger as a whole, perhaps, unprecedented.6 Malabou’s reading of change in Heidegger articulates a theme that is at once pervasive in Heidegger’s oeuvre, and yet, has no reception in the secondary literature. The reason for this curious absence is that the traditional ordering transformations of Heidegger’s texts around the ontological difference has always marginalized the philosophical significance of Heidegger’s numerous descriptions of change. However, her reading is not simply the exegetical recovery of an overlooked theme. In an account that is both meticulously documented and passing beyond the explicit level of Heidegger’s text, Malabou reads Heidegger’s thought of being itself as structured by an originary sense of mutation. Focusing on Heidegger’s conception of the Platonic origin of metaphysics as a “change [Wandel] of the essence of truth” (HC 31) she articulates a general economy of this mutability which governs the emergence and history of metaphysics. From the perspective of this overlooked sense of change she then reinterprets the meaning of being, the human, the gods and the possibility of a second beginning. At stake in her reading is the prospect of a wholly new understanding of the composition and resources of Heidegger’s thought.

    My argument in this essay is structured in three sections. In the first section, I present Malabou’s indeed seminal interpretation of ontological plasticity in Heidegger. In the second section, I then draw out the implications of an important limitation in Malabou’s reading. While her interpretation of change brings to light new aspects of Heidegger’s thought, when contextualized against the background of Heidegger’s overtly genetic account of the anteriority of being to metaphysics, it can be seen to also obfuscate important aspects of this relation. Most importantly, by disallowing any anteriority to the inaugural event of change, Malabou’s reading erases Heidegger’s crucial distinction between the first beginning [Anfang] of the history of being and the start [Beginn] of metaphysics as such. In the final section, I make a suggestion for a further application of the concept of plasticity to Heidegger’s thought. While Malabou’s treatment ranges from Being and Time to Heidegger’s later works, I argue that plasticity can also be seen to articulate Heidegger’s understanding of phenomenology as a form of life in his early Freiburg period. This earlier instance of plasticity in Heidegger does not rely upon the concept of an inaugural change, but rather, locates the emergence and dissolution of form in the plasticity of life itself. From this perspective, Malabou’s concept of plasticity can be seen as an even more apposite medium for the articulation of Heidegger’s thought."

    But there are exterior though connected forms like our chakras within (7) and without (5) that are memetically mimed and awaiting to influence our plastic potential evolution. Or is that an entirely too unthought - full thing to say?
    Last edited by R_Baird; 03-11-2016 at 11:53 AM.

  2. #22
    Join Date
    Jan 2015
    I do not find any cross talk or integration from Philosophical Plasticity people to Bucky Fuller's FORMS and functions. It is too bad - because the philosophers are taking out each other's laundry and not getting it really clean. But Jung is always (It seems) a part of what we are becoming.

    "© 2004 John Gaboury


    This is an analysis of the correlation and synergy between (1) basic psychological observations and theory, and (2) natural geometry.

    Both the triangle and square appear in nature. Buckminster Fuller recognized the tetrahedron as the basic building block of the universe. He also showed how two tetrahedrons form the basis of a stable cube. {And said the Great Pyramid as constructed in original form had two tetrahedra.} Metals have this structure. Metals conduct electricity. Our brain and body conduct psychic energy.

    The analysis relates Carl Jung's theory of Psychological Types to the stable cube, in which the forces are relatively balanced.

    Then the analysis gives a new perspective on Type theory, one which gives strong credibility to Remo Roth's emphasis that awareness of emanations from the Body Soul or Gut Brain are critical for wholeness. If we have only four of Jung's eight functions in our mind (Head Brain), two introverted and two extroverted, where are the other four? The analysis indicates they are the functions of the Gut Brain.

    In an attempt to focus on what is being discussed, not what it is named, the exposition tries to avoid mixing theory with cultural issues. All four functions (Sensing, Intuition, Thinking, and Feeling) as well as Introversion and Extroversion are in both the Head Brain and Gut Brain. For this reason, the terms Logos Psyche and Eros Psyche are not used. Logos seems to be associated with Thinking, and Eros Feeling. Nevertheless, a few implications for cultural issues in general are discussed towards the end of the analysis."
    Last edited by R_Baird; 03-11-2016 at 12:24 PM.

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